original, p. 435, 436,




I am partner in Messrs. Haldanes & McLaren, 4 North Charlotte Street, Edinburgh.

Q.- I think that you received instructions to act on behalf of Dr. Forbes-Sempill in July of last year?

A.- About the end of July last year, the very end I should say.

Q.- Did you at any time have occasion to communicate with the late Miss Margaret Forbes-Sempill?

A.- Yes, I had occasion to communicate with her in October of last year.

Q.- Can you remember the approximate date?

A.- I think the date was the 18th October.

Q.- How did you come into communication with her, were you asked to telephone her, or what happened, what instructions were you given?

A.- I was given instructions that Miss Margaret Forbes-Sempill had expressed a wish for a reconciliation between her and my client, there had I think been a rift going back a very considerable number of years, and my client actually consulted me as to what he should do in the circumstances.

Q.- Had you rung up Miss Margaret Forbes-Sempill?

A.- Yes, following on the conversation I had with my client I rang her up and told her that I had been informed that she wanted me to get in touch with her and she confirmed that, that was the case.

Q.- Can you tell me from your conversation with Miss Forbes-Sempill whether when you rang her up she had already had dinner at Brux with the First-Named Petitioner or not?

A.- Yes, my recollection is that it was the previous evening she had, had dinner and she also informed me that she was shortly to receive the first Petitioner.

Q.- Did she make any reference to you on the telephone about the statement that she had made or document which she had signed?

A.- Yes, after some unimportant conversation she mentioned to me that she had been at dinner the previous evening and that she had made a statement which she very much regretted, but she felt what she had said she had said and she could not withdraw. She however went on to use another curious expression either at this conversation or another one, she said "When Brux walked out of my life I thought I had lost a sister but I am by no means sure now she is not a brother".

Q.- And did she intimate to you her intention to see the Second Petitioner?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Were you in telephonic communication with her more than once?

A.- Yes, I think three times in all. I am not sure.

Q.- Reference has been made this morning to the circumstances in which Dr. Price was present at an examination carried out on the Second Petitioner?

A.- Yes.

original, p. 436, 437, 438, 439


Q.- I think that certain negotiations took place between you or rather your firm and Tods, Murray & Jamieson acting for the First Petitioner?

A.- Yes, roughly from the 15th September onwards.

Q.- In an endeavour to arrange that the matter at issue could be decided by Summary Trial procedure?

A.- Yes, I think that was our endeavour.

Q.- Do you know who first put forward the proposal?

A.- I know who first put forward the suggestion.

Q.- Was it first put forward by your firm?

A.- I received certain advice, and part of that advice was that consideration might be given to this possibility.

Q.- Look at No. 62, that is a letter I think from Tods, Murray & Jamieson which bears to lay down certain conditions?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Which if fulfilled would enable their client to agree. Is that the position broadly speaking?

A.- That is the position. Of course, there were negotiations before this which had broken down.

Q.- I think one of the conditions relates to medical examination?

A.- Yes, No. 2.

Q.- Just read it out?

A.- No. 2. says, "Dr. Forbes-Sempill will submit to medical examination as hereinafter mentioned before 15th November, next, and will co-operate such examination in every way producing Case History Sheets and medical records as required". Q.- It goes on to say in No. 3 "It is expected that the examiners will consist of one or more of Dr. Court Brown, Professor Roth and Dr. Strong, but will not necessarily be confined to these three gentlemen. You will appreciate our difficulty here i.e., though we have been in touch with Dr. Court Brown we have not yet been in touch with either Dr. Strong or Professor Roth and one or the other or both of these gentlemen may well be unable to assist and a substitute or indeed additional medical advice required".

A.- Yes.

Q.- Would you look please look at a further letter subsequent to that letter, dated 18th November, 1966, from Tods, Murray & Jamieson to Haldanes, No. 63 of Process. Does that letter make reference to the doctors who will carry out the examination?

A.- Yes, it quotes a letter which Mr. Macfie of Tods, Murray & Jamieson had received from Dr. Court Brown reading as follows "Regarding the matter of John Sempill discussed yesterday with your colleague Mr Haldane I am able to tell you that Professor J.A. Strong, F.R.C.P. of the Department of Medicine at the Western General Hospital is prepared clinically to examine this person. Also Miss Patricia A. Jacobs, D.Sc. is prepared to examine and report on the chromosome constitution of Mr. Sempill".

Q.- Can you tell me whether you were ever informed that Dr. Price was going to examine the Second Petitioner?

A.- No, I must say I accompanied Dr. Forbes-Sempill when he visited the hospital and Dr. Price met us and just said he was Professor Strong's assistant.

Q.- And I take it that Dr. Forbes-Sempill was unaware prior to original, p. 439, 440, 441

229 this examination Dr Price was going to be involved?

A.- Oh, certainly, he made an enormous point of this, throughout, it was with great reluctance he visited the hospital at all, it was only on my assurance I had inspected the ward which was called a one man ward and there was a way in which would not involve going through the general part of the hospital.... I had assured him of all these matters.

Q.- Did you endeavour to have the examination carried out in a private consulting room?

A.- Yes, we suggested it on several occasions to the opposite agents, and I also suggested it at the meeting which I referred to which Mr. Macfie and I had with Dr. Court Brown, and Dr. Court Brown mentioned that professor Strong did not have consulting rooms, and Dr. Court Brown said he would lend one of his own private consulting wards and there would be no fear of publicity. They took every step in their power, they invited me to have a meeting with Dr. Court Brown and paid full respect to what I said.

Q.- Finally, did the Second Petitioner after the examination speak to you about the state of his hand which he mentioned in evidence today?

A.- Yes, I remember two separate conversations, first of all I met him after the examination and he said something derogatory about clumsiness and he told me then in the car on the way back that his hand had lost feeling as a result of the investigation. He did not think anything much of it. He later telephoned me and said that this sensation of numbness had not gone away, and he made a complaint of this at various times up to quite a bit afterwards.

Q.- Did you take any action consequent upon these complaints?

A.- I took no action so far as the opposite side was concerned, I reckoned it had been a misunderstanding in all probability, but I wrote to Professor Strong and I said I was upset that my client had this complaint and he said, "Oh well, tell him to go to his own doctor in the first place and if that is not satisfactory he can come back here and we will see what we can do". I knew the one thing my client was determined not to do under any circumstances was to go back to the Western General Hospital, where unfortunately the Press had got some wind of the thing. I knew he would never go back there.

Q.- And from what my learned friend has said it would appear that Professor Strong did not intimate to those instructing my learned friend....?

A.- There again I did not make a formal complaint, and perhaps I rather smothered the thing. Rather like my client I felt there were so many differences and difficulties about and what had been done had been done, I thought it would do no good to start making formal complaints which would only upset everybody.


Q.- Just so the matter is clear, Professor Strong's examination was carried out on the joint instructions of both parties?

A.- I think that is a slightly loaded question if I may say so, the situation is this, we had negotiations from about original, p. 441, 442, 443


early September to mid-October, trying to agree on conditions on which the First Petitioner would agree to Summary Trial. These broke down absolutely. There was a meeting in the Station Hotel between Miss Forbes-Sempill and the First Petitioner which had been referred to already in evidence and some days after that there was an apparent change of heart and as one of those letters in Process No. 62 bears, the previous letters were withdrawn and this letter, the conditions of this letter of 24th October were substituted. I took them as being a statement of the conditions which we had to accept if the First Petitioner was going to agree to Summary Trial. We then adjusted them slightly and in accordance with the arrangement Messrs. Tods, Murray & Jamieson - again I don't suggest in any way improperly - drafted the joint letter of instructions which in my view corresponded with the arrangement we had entered into in this case. I therefore signed it, and to that extent it was a joint letter of instructions, but it followed on a conflict whereby they had told us the terms on which they would agree to a Summary Trial.

Q.- But the actual instructions.....?

A.- The actual letter was signed by us both. It is in Process.

Q.- Yes, it is No. 63 of Process.....


Q.-What you are really saying is it was a quid pro quo in fact?

A.- It was part of a quid pro quo.


Q.- But the point I am trying to make is that the only instructions to carry out an examination were joint?

A.- So far as Professor Strong was concerned he got joint instructions.

Q.- And he is the only person who did get joint instructions?

A.- If you accept Dr. Jacobs, that letter in fact I think gives her instructions too.

Q.- No, I don't think it does?

A.- I am sorry.

Q.- There is no suggestion that Dr. Price was instructed to carry out this examination?

A.- None, what occurred was that Professor Strong imagined his assistant as part of himself, and just carried on as if his assistant was part of himself.

Q.- That is what I rather thought the position must have been, yes. You said you had, had a conversation with Margaret Forbes-Sempill on the telephone?

A.- Yes.

Q.- When she said that she had been at Brux and had said things which she regretted?

A.-No, she said she had given a statement or given something in writing to the other side which she regretted. She then said - this mattered a good deal to me although I did not take a note at the time, I am quite sure - she then said what I have said she said, "And I can't withdraw but I wish I hadn't said it".

Q.- But she never said to you what she had said was untrue?

original, p. 443, 444


A.- She seemed to be in doubt, she regretted that she had said it, I can't say she regretted it because it was untrue or because it was a cruel thing to do, or she regretted it because she did not want a fuss, but she definitely regretted it, and as I say it was followed by this rather strange expression about Brux having walked out of her life and so on, but following a conversation with Paddy, who was Mrs. Forbes-Sempill, she was a great deal less happy about this than she was before.

Q.- But so far as what she said, she was prepared to stand by it?

A.- She said, "What I have said I can't withdraw". She neither said it was true or false, but she said "I can't withdraw it".







































original, p. 444, 445




Q.- I think you married the Second Petitioner Dr. Forbes-Sempill on the 10th October, 1952?

A.- Yes.

Q.- For how long prior to your marriage had you known the Second Petitioner?

A.- 21 years.

Q.- 21 years before your marriage or 21 years from today?

A.- 21 years from today.

Q.- For how long before your marriage had you known him?

A.- Six years.

Q.- That is to say you must have met him not very long after he took up the practice at Alford?

A.- Very shortly after.

Q.- Did you go to work for him in connection with the practice?

A.- I did.

Q.- Were you the receptionist?

A.- I was the housekeeper/receptionist.

Q.- That was in the house at Alford?

A.- Yes.

Q.- After you had been working for the doctor for some time did you come to any general impression as to his behaviour and mode of life?

A.- I came to realise that he was very much of a recluse and a very lonely and frustrated person.

Q.- Was there any reason for this which was apparent to you?

A.- It actually came to me that it was obvious he was a very unhappy person.

Q.- At that time would you say that his behaviour was approximated towards that of a man or towards that of a woman?

A.- It was exactly as it is now, that of a man.

Q.- When he was making his rounds from Alford how was he normally dressed in the early days?

A.- I have never seen my husband wear anything but male attire.

Q.- Did he wear a kilt a certain amount for doing his medical work?

A.- Not very often, he did not think it was suitable.

Q.- When he was going up Strathdon or somewhere on a far call would he wear a suit or plusfores, or breeches?

A.- It was considered more professional to wear a suit.


Q.- And that is what he generally did, is it?

A.- Yes.


Q.- Do you know whether at that time he was shaving?

A.- Yes, I do.

Q.- Was this regularly or just occasionally?

A.- It was daily.

Q.- I think that you and Dr. Forbes-Sempill entered into an

original, p. 445, 446, 447


arrangement to be married some time during 1952. Is that right?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Before you became engaged to Dr. Forbes-Sempill had you ever had intercourse with another man?

A.- Yes, I had.

Q.- Since you have been married to Dr. Forbes-Sempill have you had intercourse with him?

A.- With my husband, yes, I have.

Q.- We have been told that Dr. Forbes-Sempill has a phallic organ. During intercourse what happens to that phallic organ?

A.- It has a natural erection and climax.

Q.- Where is the phallic organ placed during intercourse?

A.- In my vagina,

Q.- Can you tell me whether during intercourse Dr. Forbes-Sempill has any emission or not?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Do you mean that he does have an emission?

A.- He has, yes.

Q.- Are you in a position to say where the emission comes from?

A.- From his phallic organ.

Q.- We have been told that the doctor's phallic organ does not have any orifice in it, and we have been told that there is an orifice close to the base of it - do you follow me?

A.- Yes, I think I do.

Q.- I want to be quite clear, whence comes the emission?

A.- It is from directly behind the phallic organ.

Q.- And may I take it that you are conscious of this during intercourse?

A.- I am, yes.

Q.- Does Dr. Forbes-Sempill live a vigorous life at the moment?

A. Very.

Q.- Is there a considerable amount of work to do on the farm?

A.- Yes, there is.

Q.- During the course of your married life to Dr. Forbes-Sempill have you had any doubts as to what sex he was?

A.- Never.

Q.- What sex does he appear to you to be?

A.- Male.

Q.- During October of last year did Miss Margaret Forbes-Sempill come and dine with you and the doctor?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Did you have a long discussion about certain matters?

A.- Yes, we had.

Q.- Was she coming to dine with you on the night that she was killed?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Was this dinner party the first occasion that she had been to the house at Brux for some time?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Can you remember was it on the 17th or the 18th October of last year?

A.- I am sorry, I can't remember.

Q.- But it was in October some time?

original, p. 447, 448, 449


A.- Yes.

Q.- And shortly before she was killed?

A.- About ten days before she was killed.


Q.- How did you first come to meet Dr. Forbes-Sempill?

A.- I was visiting my sister and I became ill and she called in the doctor, the local doctor, Dr. Forbes-Sempill.

Q.- And what was he introduced to you as?

A.- Dr. Forbes-Sempill.

Q.- Were you told by your sister whether he was a woman doctor or a man doctor?

A.- I understood that he was usually known as a woman doctor.

Q.- How long after that first meeting was it that you became employed by him?

A.- I met him in May and I went into his employment the following January.


Q.- In May. 19 ?

A.- 1946.


Q.- You went into his employment in January, 1947?

A.- 47.

Q.- On the understanding, I presume, that you were entering the employment of a woman doctor?

A.- It was never questioned, it was never discussed.

Q.- But it was accepted?

A.- It was taken for granted.

Q.- How long before you married Dr. Forbes-Sempill did you become really friendly with him?

A.- It was very difficult to say, because when you are working for someone it is difficult to become friendly , and Dr, Forbes-Sempill was not a particularly friendly person, I gradually gained his confidence as the years went past.

Q.- Let me put it another way if you can remember this, it may be difficult for you, when did you first begin to call each other by your Christian names?

A.- There was never a question of Christian names, he called me by mine and I called him Brux, which is usual.

Q.- Was this when you were on friendly terms you called him Brux?

A.- Yes, I called him Brux.

Q.- Prior to that had you addressed him as Doctor?

A.- Doctor, yes.


Q.- Did other people call him Brux?

A.- Very many of them, he was known as the Laird of Brux.

Q.- Is that why you said just now "which is usual"?

A.- Yes.


Q.- So you were calling him by a name which lots of people who knew him fairly well called him?

original, p. 449, 450, 451

235 A.- Yes.

Q.- How long before you got married did you in fact discuss the question of marriage, was the question of marriage discussed between you and Dr, Forbes-Sempill?

A.- Not very long before we were married.

Q.- When you discussed the question of marriage did you also discuss the necessity if you should get married of Dr. Forbes-Sempill re-registering himself as a male as opposed to a female?

A.- I am sorry, I don't quite understand it.

Q.- You knew, did you not, that Dr. Forbes-Sempill until he effected re-registration was registered in the Register of Births as a female?

A.- Yes, I did know.

Q.- And you would no doubt appreciate both of you, that so long as he was still registered you could not get married?

A.- Certainly.

Q.- Did you discuss the question of re-registration when you discussed the question of marriage?

A.- We had discussed the question of re-registration before we discussed marriage at all.

Q.- Were the two linked in any way?

A.- Dr. Forbes-Sempill's mind was made up to become re-registered before there was any thought of marriage with me.

Q.- Did he tell you that?

A.- I took it for granted because he did not mention marriage to me, but he had talked about becoming re-registered.

Q.- To you?

A.- Yes.

Q.- At that time when you were getting on fairly friendly terms with him?

A.- Yes, and I had become acquainted with some of the relations and his brother and his late cousin Mrs. Forbes actually told me about the doctor's condition before he did.

Q.- Had it been indicated to you by Mrs. Forbes that the doctor was not a normal male?

A.- She did not say that, what she told me was that there had been some difficulty about the doctor when he was born and his mother took her into her confidence, she was an old friend of a like age group and she confided in her.

Q.- Did you understand there was some difficulty in connection with the sex at that time, is that what you understood?

A.- I understood it was a question of choice, his mother was grief-stricken about the loss of a little daughter and she said that she would like this done this way.

Q.- This is what Mrs. Forbes told you she had been told?

A.- By my husband's mother.

Q.- But you know don't you that your husband is not a normal male?

A.- I would rather say there might be an imbalance of nature.

Q.- I am sorry to put this question to you, but you know he is not a normal male to look at?

A.- I am sorry, I can't agree to that, I think he is.

Q.- You are not suggesting for instance, that his genitalia are normal male genitalia?

A.- No I am not.

original, p. 451, 452 236 Q.- Are you able to express any view as to whether the wish to get married played a major part in your husband's application for re-registration?

A.- I think that consistently through the years that it was to preserve his integrity.

Q.- Do you think it had anything to do with the fact that he wanted to get married?

A.- I suppose if I was very vain I might think so, but primarily it was to preserve his integrity and to get him out of his difficulties and live what was to him a normal and natural life.

Q.- You did in fact get married very shortly after the re-registration had taken place?

A.- Yes, about a month afterwards.

Q.- There is just one other matter which I must I think clear up. You were asked some questions about intercourse, and I think you said you were conscious of an emission?

A.- Yes.

Q.- I take it because of the particular genitals which your husband possesses there were no questions of anything being emitted into you?

A.- Oh yes.

Q.- How is this achieved?

A.- In the usual way.

Q.- You are aware there is nothing in your husband's phallic organ through which anything can be emitted, are you not?

A.- I am perfectly aware of where it comes from and I am also aware of what happens in contact.


Q.- Perhaps at this stage I might ask you this, can you describe in your own words what effect intercourse has so far as you are concerned?

A.- Complete satisfaction.

Q.- Can you elaborate, I am thinking of the physical effects on you if you can describe them?

A.- I can honestly say normal complete reaction and satisfaction.

Q.- I take it you know what I mean by orgasm, do you?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Can you say whether or not you experience that during intercourse?

A.- Yes, I do.

Q.- On all occasions or on some?

A.- On All occasions.

Q.- Can you give me any indication of the frequency you have had intercourse over the years approximately?

A,- Over the years sometimes twice a week, sometimes less, according to physical fatigue and different circumstances, indisposition.

(No re-examination)

Counsel for the Second Petitioner put in Documents as per Inventory and closed his Proof. Certified as correct

Shorthand Writer

Original, p. 1, 2, 3








LORD HUNTER:- This Petition for Summary Trial raises questions of a highly unusual character on which there appears to be little authority in the Law of Scotland. These questions arise in the following way. The Right Honourable William Forbes-Sempill, 17th Baron and 8th Baronet of the Baronetcy of Forbes of Craigievar, which understand is a Nova Scotia Baronetcy, died on the 21st July, 1905. He had five sons, three of whom died unmarried without issue. His eldest son was the Right Honourable John Forbes-Sempill, 18th Baron Sempill and 9th Baronet, who died on 28th February, 1934, and who had four children. These were the Right Honourable William Francis Forbes-Sempill, 19th Baron Sempill and 10th Baronet (hereinafter referred to as "Lord Sempill"), the Honourable Gwendoline Forbes-Sempill and the Honourable Margaret Forbes-Sempill, who are both now dead, and the Second Petitioner. Lord Sempill died on 30th December, 1965, survived by female children only and never having had male children. The youngest son of the 17th Baron Sempill and 8th Baronet was Rear Admiral The Honourable Arthur Lionel Ochoncar Forbes Sempill, who died on 9th May, 1962, survived inter alios by his only son, the First Petitioner. On Lord Sempill's death his eldest daughter succeeded to the Barony of Sempill, which descends on a destination which admits females to the succession. The said Baronetcy of Forbes of Craigievar descends on a destination to heirs male. The parties are agreed that failing heirs male nearer in line of succession to Lord Sempill, the First Petitioner would be entitled as heir male of the original grantee and of Lord Sempill to succeed to the said Baronetcy. The parties are also agreed that the Second Petitioner is nearer in line of succession.

The Second Petitioner was born on 6th September, 1912, at Fintray House, Fintray. On 22nd September, 1912, the Second Petitioner's father registered the birth as female and with the name of Elizabeth Forbes-Sempill. In about 1952 the second Petitioner craved the Sheriff of Aberdeen, Kincardine and Banff at Aberdeen to grant warrant in terms of Section 63 of the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act, 1854, to the Registrar of the District of Fintray in the County of Aberdeen to make an entry in his Register of Corrected Entries relative to Entry No. 9 in the Register Book of Births for the said District for the year 1912, which related to the Second Petitioner, substituting the Christian name "Ewan" for the Christian name "Elizabeth", and the sex letter "M" for the sex letter "F". The said application proceeded Original, p. 3, 4, 5


upon the narrative that from birth the Second Petitioner was brought up as a female, but had been found on medical examination to be male. On 21st August, 1952, the Sheriff Substitute pronounced an Interlocutor in the following terms:

"Aberdeen 21st August 1952. The Sheriff Substitute, having examined upon Oath the Petitioner E. Forbes-Sempill the foregoing application and Medical Certificates produced in support thereof from (1) Dr. John C.Reid, (2) Dr. William G.C.Manson, and (3) Dr. James F.Philip, finds that the said Petitioner is of the male sex and that Entry No. 9 in the Register Book of Births for the District of Fintray in the County of Aberdeen for the year 1912 is erroneous. Grants Warrant to the Registrar of said District to make an Entry in his Register of Corrected Entries relative to said Entry No. 9 substituting the Christian name "Ewan" for the Christian name "Elizabeth" in the First Column and the letter "M" for "F" in the Third Column of the said Entry and also to insert a reference in the margin of the said Entry. A.J.Loutitt Laing".

On the death of Lord Sempill both Petitioners lodged claims with the Secretary of State for the Home Department to succeed to Lord Sempill's said Baronetcy. The claim by the Second Petitioner has now been withdrawn. The Secretary of State has indicated that he is not prepared to enter the First Petitioner's name on the Register of the Baronetage in the present circumstances. He has, however, further indicated that in the event of the Court pronouncing an Interlocuture under Section 10 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act, 1933, finding that the First Petitioner is the heir male of Lord Sempill he will enter his name on the said Register. After the death of Lord Sempill the First Petitioner raised an Action against the Second Petitioner and Others concluding inter alia for reduction of the said Interlocuture dated 21st August, 1952, and for Declarator that he is heir male of Lord Sempill. The Summons in the said Action was signeted and served, but by agreement between the Petitioners has not been lodged for calling. Thereafter, by agreement between the Petitioners and upon the joint instructions of their respective Solicitors, the Second Petitioner on 26th November, underwent a medical examination, to which reference will be made later in this Opinion. On 13th March, 1967, the present Petition for summary Trial was presented under and in terms of Section 10 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act, 1933, and Rule 231 of the Rules of Court. The question on which the Petitioners desire a decision is set forth in Paragraph 9 of the Petition and is in the following terms:

"Is the First Petitioner the heir male of Lord Sempill?"

The First Petitioner contended that this question should be answered in the affirmative, whereas the Second Petitioner maintained that it should be answered in the negative. Counsel for the parties presented their arguments on the basis that the answer to the question, which according to its terms is one of succession and which relates solely to the claim by the Original, p. 5, 6, 7


First Petitioner to the said Baronetcy, depended on the sex to which the Second Petitioner was to be assigned. The first Petitioner maintains that the Second Petitioner is now and has all along been of the female sex in the physical, anatomical, physiological and genetic meaning of that term, that the Second Petitioner is therefore female, that the First Petitioner is in the circumstance heir male of Lord Sempill and he is entitled as such to succeed to the said Baronetcy of Forbes of Craigievar in succession to Lord Sempill. The Second Petitioner on the other hand contends that the Second Petitioner is now and has all along been of the male sex in respect that he is an hermaphrodite with predominant male characteristics. It may be observed in passing that to refer to the Second Petitioner in the masculine gender is to appear to beg a question which naturally bulked large at the Hearing. But some such means of reference must be adopted, and I propose in this Opinion, without in any way begging the question, to refer to the Second Petitioner in the masculine except in passages where a neutral term can be used without inconvenience.

On the joint motion of the parties I appointed a Proof to be taken before me. The parties were agreed that the whole trial, including the Proof and the Hearing on Evidence, should proceed before me in Chambers, and I consented to that procedure as being entirely proper and appropriate, having regard to the whole circumstances, including the nature of much of the evidence to be led. It may be observed in this connection that there is evidence that actions by certain representatives of the Press had led in the present case to a degree of secretiveness in connection with the taking of certain biopsies which might have resulted in evidence of facts of a most important and material character being left in doubt. The evidence led at the Proof considerably supplemented the facts narrated by the parties in the Petition, on which the narrative contained in the introduction to this Opinion is largely based. The evidence led at the Proof involved considerable controversies both of fact and of medical opinion, but before dealing with those matters it is convenient first to deal with the principles of law which have to be applied in a situation where the sex of a person is in doubt, particularly in a case where the problem, rare, it maybe said, in the extreme, of the intersex condition of True Hermaphroditism is presented. The expression "true hermaphrodite" is in a sense tautologous, but it has been found convenient as a means of referring to a person who has both testicular and ovarian tissue, as distinct from persons exhibiting other intersex conditions, such as those, including Klinefelter's Syndrome, sometimes classified under the general, though somewhat inexact, heading of Pseudo- Hermaphroditism, and also from persons exhibiting symptoms of sexual aberrations or deviations, such, for example, as Homosexuality, where by definition the sexual impulse is directed towards a person or persons of the same sex, and those cases of Trans-sexualism where there is a drive by the individual concerned to achieve a social sex opposite to his or her physical sex.

Of the authorities cited to me the highest is undoubtedly that Original, p. 7, 8, 9, 10


of Stair, but in the passage in which he makes reference to hermaphroditism he is concerned with capacity to consent in the context of the constitution of marriage and of impotence. "So the consent of persons naturally impotent or of a dubious kind, as hermaphrodites, when the one sex doth not eminently predomine, doth not make marriage". Stair Institutions 1, 4, 6. As some play was made with the words "eminently predomine" (the italics are mine), it is well to bear in mind the context, and the same comment may be made with regard to certain of the other authorities or sources to which I was referred. The idea of one sex predominating does, however, seem to be an echo from a more general consideration in the Civil Law as to the sex to which persons ought by law to be assigned. The Digest contains the following opinion of Ulpian, which bears to be an expression of general principle, not confined to any particular branch of the law.

"Quaeritur: hermaphrodotum cui comparamus? et magis puto eius sexus aestimandum, qui in eo praevalet." D. I, 5, 10. This is rendered in Scott, the Civil Law, Vol. 2 p 229, as: "The question has been raised to which sex shall we assign an hermaphrodite? And I am of the opinion that its sex should be determined from that which predominates in it." The Dutch civilians followed the text of the Civil Law. Grotius under the chapter heading "Of the legal condition of persons", stated the principle thus: "Persons actually born are male or female: what are called hermaphrodites are referred to one or other sex according to the prevailing character". Jurisprudence of Holland (Lee's Translation) I iii, 6; cf. Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas I, 5, 1. It is interesting to find in Forbes' Institutes a statement of the law to the same effect. "The sex is Male or Female, or an Hermaphrodite, i.e. both Male and Female, which is esteemed to be of that Sex which is most prevailing in the person." Forbes' Institutes of the Law of Scotland (1722) I, 1, p. 18. No other Scottish authority appears to exist, and I was told that there is no reported Scottish, English or American decision in which the question of principle has been considered.

In deference to the industry of counsel it is right that I should make a reference to certain other citations, although I doubt if they advance the matter much further. Like the passage from Stair which I have quoted, they deal for the most part with particular branches of the law. The citations included a text of Paulus, where the subject under consideration was the capacity of an hermaphrodite to act as witness: "Hermaphroditus an ad testamentum adhibiri possit, qualitas sexus incalescentis ostendit." D, XXII, 5, 15. This is I think somewhat loosely, rendered by Scott: "For an hermaphrodite to be qualified to testify in the case of a will it must be proved which sex is predominant." Scot, The Civil Law, Vol. 5 p. 235. The German civilians appear to base themselves on the passages which I have cited from the Digest. Spiegal, Lexicon Juris Civilis, Index; Dauth De Testamentis, p. 255 para. 310. The passage from Dauth, which contains some interesting nature lore, is not altogether easy to follow, but might, in the context of succession, be taken to support the view that, in a Original, p. 10, 11, 12,


case where the sexual characteristics are in exactly equal balance as between male and female, an hermaphrodite should be treated as male. cf. Smith, Short Commentary, p. 250. The following observations by Dauth may in particular be referred to: "Aut hermphroditus est. Tales enim non solum in rebus hereditariis succedunt; sed etiam in dubio pro maribus habentur, si in sexu masculino incalescant." I may say in passing that the use in this connection of the words "incalescentis" and "incalescant", which may well bear the primary meaning of growing warm or kindling with love, suggests to me that the Civil Law, in approaching this problem, took into account other considerations in addition to those of external appearance. Reference was also made to an elaborate treatment of the subject with some individual touches, by the Spanish Jesuit Sanchez under the heading "De impedimenti matrimoniis". De Sancto Matrimonii Sacramento Disputationum, Disputatio CVI p. 380. This writer proceeds on the Civil Law text of Ulpian, expressing an opinion that an hermaphrodite should be assigned to one sex or the other "juxta sexum in ipso praevalentum". It is interesting to note that Sanches suggests, at least a possibility, that, in a case where the characteristics are in equal balance as between male and female, the person concerned could make a final and binding election, which would for the future assign such an hermaphrodite to one sex or the other, subject, it would seem, to dire religious sanctions if any attempt were made to reverse the position. That suggestion is, however, made in the course of a discussion of the law of marriage and of impediments thereto, and is therefore subject to the same comment as those already made in relation to the passage from Stair. The same may be said of the passage from Planiol. Planiol, Traitè Elemementaire De Droit Civile, (Tr. Louisiana Institute) I 1005/1006. That passage is not in my opinion of any real assistance towards reaching a conclusion as to the principle to be applied in a case such as the present, where the question at issue is identification of sex. Nor, it may be added, is the second of the cases to which the author refers. See Sirey, French Legislation and Decisions, 1904. I. 273.

In the almost complete absence of Scottish authority, I would not hesitate to accept guidance, in relation to such a subject matter, from the Civil Law and from Civilian writers of authority. That guidance must no doubt be accepted with some reservation. In the modern age, and indeed in the last few years, very remarkable advances have taken place in medical science as applied to this particular subject matter. Moreover, the term "hermaphrodite" was clearly used in the authorities to which I have referred in a much wider sense than the medical evidence in the present case would indicate as being acceptable scientifically at the present time. Nevertheless the broad principles of the Civil Law appear to me to be sound and to accord with common sense and with the requirements of modern society. The first of these principles is that persons actually born are either male or female. This is self-evident, since, to take merely one example, it might perhaps plausibly be argued that a true hermaphrodite was medically of both Original, p. 12, 13, 14, 15


sexes and therefore legally of neither. In a society such as ours, however, such an approach could not in my opinion be accepted, and neither party in the present case sought to support it. Our law, our customs and our religion, for those who profess it, appear to me to require that each person in our society should be assigned to one sex or the other. The alternative would be to place the individual whose sex is medically ambiguous in a special category, neither male nor female, with legal consequences effecting that individual and others of a multitudinous and far-reaching character. Such a solution would in my opinion demand legislation, of which I would not care to be the draftsman. The proposition that persons actually born are male or female is in my opinion destructive of the argument by counsel for the First Petitioner, founded on the passage from Stair, that in the legal identification of sex the test, in the case of an hermaphrodite, is not whether there is predominance, but whether there is eminent predominance, of one sex or the other. The logical application of such a principle would involve that certain persons of ambiguous sex would find themselves in a part of the spectrum that was neither male nor female, as a result which the law could not in my opinion accept in practice, having regard to the society in which we live.

What I have just said anticipates the second principle which is in my opinion derived from the Civil Law, namely that an hermaphrodite should be assigned to one sex or the other according to the sexual characteristics which are found in that person to prevail or predominate. Fortunately, in the case of the vast majority of human beings, sex is irreversibly established, at latest, early in the foetal stage, sex differentiation and development proceed within normal limits, and the assigning of the individual at birth to his or her appropriate social sex presents no real difficulty. In a relatively tiny minority of cases, however, and for a variety of reasons, the diagnosis of sex at birth may present very difficult problems for the doctor. These problems, needless to say, may be even more baffling to the parents. Inevitably, in a few cases of ambiguous sex, mistakes are made, and births are registered in what proves later to have been the wrong sex. Such cases may result in deep human unhappiness and misery, but, even so, the principles which I have stated is in my opinion the only reasonable and common-sense legal basis upon which to proceed in cases of intersex. The alternative of forcing persons of ambiguous sex into one compartment or the other, which, with a very few unfortunate exceptions, probably works well enough, or at least as well as can be hoped for, in practice is to place them in a separate legal category of their own, which in my opinion would be a much worse fate in a society such as ours. Thus, while from a medical point of view sex is probably a spectrum, with the true hermaphrodite in or near the centre and with gradiations outwards in the direction of the typical male towards one end and the typical female towards the other, the law, which is concerned in a practical way with the sexual role of the individual in society, must in my opinion attempt to draw a firm line, which leaves males on Original, p. 15, 16, 17


one side and females on the other according to the sexual characteristics which predominate in the person concerned. It follows from what I have said that a true hermaphrodite may fall on one side of the line or the other according to the circumstances, and that the solution of the problem in a particular case may involve very difficult and narrow questions of fact. However, as medical knowledge increases, the scope for error will, one hopes, decrease.

The solution of the problem, which I consider to be sound in principle, inevitably raises the further question, by no means purely theoretical, as to what is to happen in the limiting case, where there is no predominance and where the male and female sexual characteristics are in precisely equal balance. I do not suggest the answer to this question is easy, although it is the sort of problem which the law has to answer in many contexts. The suggestion, which derives some support from the passage in Dauth already referred to, that such persons should as a matter of law be regarded as males does not, except for the fact that it would provide a definite rule, attract me. Indeed, it is difficult to see any justification for an arbitrary rule such as this in a society which seems to be moving towards equality for males and females under the law. It might be said, with equal reason or unreason, that such persons should as a matter of law be regarded as female, and it might even be argued that the lot of the average effeminate male would be less unhappy under such a dispensation than under the rule suggested by Dauth. I am also disposed to reject the solution suggested by Sanchez in the context of impediments to marriage, namely, some form of final election by the person concerned. In an age when the terrors of punishment for mortal sin could control the actions of even the most hardened of sinners, such a rule might no doubt have worked well enough in practice, but, in an age when one regularly sees perjury committed in a manner which can only be described as lighthearted, the dangers of leaving such a matter to the personal choice of the individual, even under the sanction of an oath, are in my opinion unacceptable. It is one thing to make life in society easier for those who exhibit the intersex conditions of Hermaphroditism or Pseudo-hermaphroditism, and quite another to leave a possible loophole for those suffering from sexual aberrations or deviations, such as certain trans-sexuals, who may have the strongest motives or drives to pass, legally or illegally, from one side of the sexual spectrum to the other, and who, in the event of success in achieving the social sex of their desire, might bring disastrous consequences not only upon themselves but upon others in the society in which they live. I therefore reject the suggested solution of a final and binding election made, however publicly, by the person concerned. In reaching that conclusion I am not, however, to be taken as saying that the psychological attitude and orientation of the person concerned cannot be an adminicle of evidence pointing towards a solution of the question of sexual predominance. That is a matter with which I shall deal later in this Opinion. Meanwhile, having rejected both the arbitrary rule suggested by Dauth and the expedient Original, p. 17, 18, 19, 20


apparently supported by Sanchez, the only alternative solution for the limiting case is in my opinion that of the onus of proof. No doubt this is a disappointing conclusion for those who wish that law could be an exact science, but, in cases where difficult questions of degree have to be solved, it is sometimes necessary to fall back on onus of proof as a ground of decision at the stage where the facts on one side and the other are found to be in exactly even balance. Needless to say, onus of proof in this connection should not be a point of departure, but should be employed as a means of resolving the problem only when all the facts have been ascertained and, when weighed in the balance, have to be found to point as a matter of reasonable probability neither in one direction nor the other.

According to the evidence in the present case, the main medical criteria of sex, according to present knowledge, are fourfold, namely chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, apparent or phenotypical sex, and psychological sex. The first three of these criteria were sometimes grouped together in the evidence under the descriptions "physical sex" or "anatomical sex". According to the evidence, chromosomal sex is determined at the moment of conception. A normal human being has 22 pairs of autosomes plus 2 sex chromosomes, a total of 46.

The normal female has 2 X chromosomes, and is chromatin-positive. The normal male has 1 X and 1 Y chromosomes, and is chromatin-negative. The normal female is said to have a 46 XX constitution or karyotype. The normal male is said to have a 46 XY constitution or karyotype. The results of sex chromatin and chromosome investigations, which were carried out in the present case by a highly experienced scientist, showed the Second Petitioner to have two X chromosomes, and therefore if, but only if, the tests had ben exhaustive,as they were not and could not be, genetically to be a normal female. I emphasise the word genetically, because, although an individual with a 46 XX karyotype normally develops as a female and an individual with a 46 XX karyotype as a male, this is not an invariable rule. The reasons for variations from the rule are not at the present day fully understood, and one considerable area of doubt is whether it is possible for testicular tissue to develop in the absence of a Y chromosome in the constitution of the individual concerned.

The existence of what appears to be a 46 XX karyotype in a true hermaphrodite presents a somewhat baffling problem, since ex hypothesi the person concerned has testicular as well as ovarian tissue, but it appears from the evidence that such a situation is not unknown. As it seems, perhaps, not unreasonable to assume that the presence of testicular tissue suggests the existence at some time of a Y chromosome, at least three hypotheses have been advanced to account for the failure, in the case of some true hermaphrodites, to find a Y chromosome by the presently recognised scientific tests. These hypotheses are mosaicism, translocation and loss. Whatever the true explanation of these matters may be, I am satisfied that, at any rate in the case of a true hermaphrodite, chromosomal sex is the least valuable of the available criteria, when the

Original, p. 20, 21, 22


matter under consideration is not a medical and parental decision as to the social sex in which an infant should be reared, which decision may involve, amongst other things, surgical interference with the genitalia and treatment with hormones, but the legal identification of sex in an adult. Indeed, if it be the fact that the existence of a Y chromosome in the constitution is essential to the development of testicular tissue, it cannot even be said that a true hermaphrodite, whose karyotype as disclosed by existing techniques from the available specimens is 46 XX, was intended by nature to be a female.

I turn therefore to the criterion of gonadal sex. Once again it is not difficult to state what is found in a normal human being. A normal female has two ovaries intra-abdominal, whereas a normal male has two testes external to the abdomen. The sex of the gonad is determined from its histological structure. In the present case it is in my opinion established by the evidence that the Second Petitioner has one male gonad in the form of a mal-descended testis, which at the present time is situated in the left groin in the area of the left inguinal ring below the inguinal canal on that side. I do not go into the somewhat unusual circumstances under which the biopsies, leading, together with other evidence, to this finding, were taken, because it was accepted by counsel for both parties that the presence of testicular tissue on the left side had as matter of probability been proved. Although it has not been positively established that any ovarian tissue exists in the body of the Second Petitioner, the weight of the expert evidence is in my opinion to the effect that such tissue is more likely to be present than not, although the question whether it is present in the form of an ovary or of an ovotestis, and, if either, in what position, belong to the realm of speculation. I should add, in the foregoing connection, that there is no evidence which satisfies me that the Second Petitioner has ever menstruated. On the contrary, although it is apparently not unknown for a true hermaphrodite to have menstrual periods, I am disposed to accept the evidence of the Second Petitioner that he has never menstruated, a conclusion to which evidence of a degree of parental anxiety during his adolescence lends some probability. In relation to this and other matters counsel for the First Petitioner founded strongly on the letter No. 47. of Process. Having regard to the ratio of Young.v.National Coal Board 1960 S.C.6, I consider it doubtful whether this letter from the Second Petitioner's sister, who is now deceased, to the First Petitioner's solicitor is admissible in evidence. cf. Geils.v.Geils 1855, 17 D.397, per L.P. McNeil at p. 404. But, assuming in favour of the First Petitioner that it is, I prefer the evidence of the Second Petitioner at the points where that evidence and the statements in the letter are in conflict. As regards the matter of menstruation, there is no indication as to how the Second Petitioner's sister came by her information, if come by it she did. Having regard inter alia to the differences in age and upbringing between the Second Petitioner and the author of the letter, it may well be that the statement made about

Original, p. 22, 23, 24, 25


menstruation in the letter No. 47 of Process was based on hearsay or even double hearsay, and quite possibly on information that was intended to be misleading. In any event, the general quality of the evidence contained in No. 47 of Process, even assuming that it is admissible, is in my opinion open to question. The whole matter was one which the Second Petitioner's sister clearly found to be upsetting. It is obvious from further evidence that her state of mind at the material time was confused, probably because she could not understand the situation, and the terms of the letter itself leave an impression of partisanship, and something approaching resentment or pique towards the Second Petitioner, an attitude which happily seems to have been resolved shortly before her sudden death in a motor accident.

Having regard to the whole evidence I consider that, as matter of probability, the Second Petitioner is a true hermaphrodite, in what Professor Strong called the classical sense. This, I may add, was the hypothesis upon which the main arguments for the parties on either side were based. The only other hypothesis suggested, though less probable, was that the case was one of a Klinefelter-like Syndrome, a diagnosis which I understood would, if anything, be more favourable to the view that the Second Petitioner is a male than the diagnosis of true hermaphroditism. It follows from what I have said that the gonadal sex in this case is probably ambiguous, but the established presence of testicular tissue is, for several reasons, a fact of very considerable importance. As I have indicated, it may, according to one theory or hypothesis, postulate the existence of a Y chromosome somewhere in the constitution of the Second Petitioner, a possibility which in itself makes it somewhat dangerous to rely too much on the criterion of chromosomal sex as derived from the scientific tests which it was possible to carry out in the present case. But, what is in my opinion far more important, from the point of view of legal identification of sex, is the practical consideration that the presence of a testis would readily and logically account for signs of masculinization in the Second Petitioner, regarded from both the physiological and psychological points of view. It was broadly accepted in the expert evidence that, although chromosomal sex is probably determined at the moment when the sperm fertilises the ovum, sex differentiation does not take place until a later stage. I also understood it to be generally accepted that male hormones, known as androgens, produced by a testis or testes are essential ingredients of male development of the foetus. It appears that, if testicular androgens are not supplied at the proper time, masculinization will not take place, and the product will be a human being of the female apparent or pheno-typical sex. It seems that this would happen even if ovarian tissue was not present in the foetus. Thus the criterion of gonadal sex demonstrates that the Second Petitioner is neither a normal male nor a normal female. It leaves unsolved the question whether the Second Petitioner should be regarded as an abnormal male or an abnormal female, using the word abnormal in its literal and not in any pejorative sense. The criterion of gonadal sex certainly

Original, p. 25, 26, 27


does not destroy the proposition that the sex of the Second Petitioner is male,and it supports the view, in my opinion, that there is a constitutional basis for the degree of masculine physical development and psychological orientation to which I will be referring in a moment. It is, moreover, of some importance that the testis which has been found to be present in the Second Petitioner, although mal-descended and showing evidence of poor sperm production, was nevertheless found to be capable of some degree of spermatogenesis. A few identifiable spermatozoa were observed, and one of the witnesses, who examined the specimens provided from the testis in question, expressed the opinion that tissue obtained by means of one of the biopsies indicated a well formed testicular apparatus, in respect that not only were seminiferous tubules present but also a well formed conducting mechanism to the exterior. It is interesting to note that, although the probability appears to be that the Second Petitioner is infertile, Professor Strong, who gave evidence for the First Petitioner, could not say that it was impossible that the Second Petitioner could introduce children of his marriage.

I now turn to apparent or pheno-typical sex. Although I have found the problems in this connection difficult and, in some respects, almost baffling, I do not think it is necessary to enter into great detail. I confess I have not found terminology of much assistance, and i doubt if expressions such as "under-developed male" or "masculinized or virilised female" take one any distance towards a solution. The matter must in the end of the day be one of impression and degree on the whole available evidence, and the fact that medical opinion has been expressed on either side by experts whose qualifications and experience in this field are beyond question emphasises the difficulty of the problem. My conclusions are that, judged purely by appearance, the external genitalia are predominantly female, but, judged by function, they are predominantly male. In the latter respect I regard the evidence of the wife of the Second Petitioner as being of great importance. Although she obviously might have a strong interest in the matter, I was impressed by both the content and the manner of her evidence. The fact that in sexual intercourse the Second Petitioner is, despite his physical handicaps, able to penetrate with his phallus the vagina of his wife and to function mechanically as a male, to the satisfaction both of himself and his partner and to the point of orgasm and emission, is in my opinion of greater importance than the predominantly female external appearance of the genitalia, which no doubt was largely responsible for him being reared in the social sex of a female. There is, it may be noted, no evidence that the Second Petitioner ever has or ever could, for the purpose of intercourse, function mechanically in the sexual role of the female, or that any attempt to do so could lead to satisfaction on the part either of the Second Petitioner or of a male partner. So far as concerns other features apart from the external genitalia, my conclusion is that the apparent sex of the Second Petitioner is predominantly

Original, p. 27, 28, 29, 30


male, although, as one would expect, there is here also a degree of ambiguity.Looking at the whole evidence relating to the apparent or pheno-typical sex, including the Second Petitioner's physical capacities and stamina as spoken to, for example, by Dr. Manson, I am of the opinion that in the Second Petitioner it is the male characteristics which predominate.

The final criterion which falls to me considered is what is called in the evidence psychological sex. There was considerable argument before me as to whether it could ever be proper to take this aspect of the matter into account when the question was the legal identification of sex, as contrasted, for example, with the making of a decision as to the best medical, surgical or psychiatric treatment in cases of intersex or trans-sexualism. I am far from saying, to take an example, that a finding that the psychological sex of an individual was male would ever justify a conclusion that a person was legally a male although the physical sex of that person was clearly female, but, in a case where a person can function sexually as a male to the extent which the Second Petitioner is able to do, and where there can be found in that person's body male gonadal tissue from which masculine attitudes, behaviour and desires, both sexual and otherwise, as well as masculine physical characteristics, may reasonably be assumed to have emanated, directly or indirectly, the fact that the psychological sex is male is in my opinion an adminicle of evidence of some importance. I consider that there is in the present case overwhelming evidence that the psychological sex of the Second Petitioner is male, and having regard to the nature of his upbringing and the family and social difficulties with which he has been confronted, it does not surprise me that, in spite of his lifelong feeling of being a misfit in the social sex of female, he did not take the definitive step of re-registration until he was almost 40.

Taking all the criteria together it is my opinion that the Second Petitioner is a true hermaphrodite in whom the male sexual characteristics predominate, and that this has been the position throughout his life. The evidence of expert medical opinion led on behalf of the Second Petitioner is in my opinion both coherent and weighty, and my conclusion, after considering the whole evidence more than once with greatest care, is that it must prevail against the evidence to the contrary effect, particularly from Professor Strong, whose views may have been coloured to some extent by his original diagnosis of congenital adrenal hyperplasia, a diagnosis which has now been disproved. The evidence of Dr. Price at pp. 98 to 99 of the Notes of Evidence is in this respect rather striking. I have not found it necessary to proceed to any extent on onus of proof, but, if it had been necessary to do so, the result would in my opinion have been the same, since, as counsel for the First Petitioner conceded, correctly in my opinion, the initial onus would be on the First Petitioner to displace somebody standing between him and the Baronetcy. It follows from what I have said that I answer the question in the Petition in the negative.

Original, p. 30, 31


I should perhaps add that I raised with the parties the question whether the dispute or question set forth in the Petition for decision was or was not a dispute or question affecting the status of any person within the meaning of Section 10 (8) of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act, 1933, and Rule of Court 231 (o), and also whether there were any grounds for making a report under Rule of Court 231 (h). Counsel for the parties were able to satisfy me that the dispute or question set forth in the Petition was not a dispute or question affecting the status of any person within the meaning of the said provision. The dispute or question does not fall expressly within the inclusive definition contained in Rule of Court 231 (o), nor does it bear according to its terms to affect the status of any person. The question, as put, is one of succession, and the sole positive or practical result which could have emerged from the proceeding was that, if the Court had pronounced an Interlocutor answering the question in the affirmative, the Secretary of State for the Home Department would, if he had acted in accordance with the indications given by him, have entered the name of the First Petitioner on the Register of The Baronetage. As it has turned out the question has been answered in the negative, but in either event I am of the opinion that the dispute question did not affect the status of any person, and in particular of the First or the Second Petitioner. For the same reasons it did not appear to me that the determination of the dispute or question might affect the status of any party, and there were therefore no grounds in my opinion for reporting the matter under Rule of Court 231 (h).



Lord Hunter

29th December 1967,